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1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
he commercial paper market experienced considerable 
strain in the weeks following Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. The Reserve Primary 
Fund—a prime money market mutual fund with $785 million 
in exposure to Lehman Brothers—“broke the buck” on 
September 16, triggering an unprecedented flight to quality 
from high-yielding to Treasury-only money market funds. 
These broad investor flows within the money market sector 
severely disrupted the ability of commercial paper issuers to 
roll over their short-term liabilities.
As redemption demands accelerated, particularly in high-
yielding money market mutual funds, investors became 
increasingly reluctant to purchase commercial paper, especially 
for longer dated maturities. As a result, an increasingly high 
percentage of outstanding paper had to be refinanced each day, 
interest rates on longer term commercial paper increased 
significantly, and the volume of outstanding paper declined 
sharply. These market disruptions had the potential to 
constrain the economic activities of commercial paper issuers. 
Indeed, a large share of outstanding commercial paper is issued 
or sponsored by financial intermediaries, and the difficulties 
they faced placing commercial paper further reduced their 
ability to meet the credit needs of businesses and households.
In light of these strains, the Federal Reserve announced the 
creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) on 
October 7, 2008, with the aim of supporting the orderly 
functioning of the commercial paper market. Registration for 
the CPFF began October 20, 2008, and the facility became 
operational on October 27. The CPFF operated as a lender-
of-last-resort facility for the commercial paper market. It 
effectively extended access to the Federal Reserve’s discount 
window to issuers of commercial paper, even if these issuers 
were not chartered as commercial banks. Unlike the discount 
window, the CPFF was a temporary liquidity facility that was 
authorized under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act in 
the event of “unusual and exigent circumstances.” It expired 
February 1, 2010.1 
The goal of the CPFF was to address temporary liquidity 
distortions in the commercial paper market by providing a 
backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper. This liquidity 
backstop provided assurance to both issuers and investors that 
firms would be able to roll over their maturing commercial 
paper. The facility enabled issuers to engage in term lending 
funded by commercial paper issuance, which in turn enhanced 
the ability of financial intermediaries to extend crucial credit 
to U.S. businesses and households. 
The CPFF did not address the solvency of issuing firms. 
Rather, the focus was on shielding the allocation of real 
economic investment from liquidity distortions created by the 
run on high-yielding money market instruments that had been 
1 Initially, the CPFF was set to expire on April 30, 2009, but it was extended 
to October 30 and subsequently to February 1, 2010.
Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, and Dina Marchioni
The authors thank Sarah Bell, Marco Del Negro, Michael Fleming, Kenneth 
Garbade, Warren Hrung, Peter Kyle, James McAndrews, Patricia Mosser, 
Robert Patalano, and Joshua Rosenberg for substantial comments and 
contributions. Some sections of this paper are based on notes prepared by 
James McAndrews and Joshua Rosenberg in October 2008. Hoai-Luu Nguyen 
and Jordan Winder provided outstanding research assistance. The views 
expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
The Federal Reserve’s 
Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility
Tobias Adrian is a vice president, Karin Kimbrough an assistant vice president, 
and Dina Marchioni a markets officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Correspondence: tobias.adrian@ny.frb.org
T26 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
 
Chart 1
Outstanding Commercial Paper 











10 05 00 95 90 85 1980
M1
Asset-backed
triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The facility 
was explicitly designed to protect the Federal Reserve from 
potential credit losses. Issuance to the CPFF was either secured 
by collateral or subject to an additional surcharge, which was 
calibrated to protect the Federal Reserve from any potential 
credit losses.
This paper offers an overview of the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility. We explain the economic role of the 
commercial paper market as a source of funding for various 
financial intermediaries. We briefly review the events 
surrounding the turmoil that led to the creation of the CPFF. 
Our study also presents operational details of the CPFF and 
documents its usage and effectiveness. In addition, we discuss 
the economics of the facility in the context of the financial 
system and in relation to the Federal Reserve’s role as lender 
of last resort. Also considered are issues associated with the risk 
of moral hazard that have been raised following the launch of 
the CPFF. 
2. Background on the Commercial 
Paper Market 
The commercial paper market is used by commercial banks, 
nonbank financial institutions, and nonfinancial corporations 
to obtain short-term external funding. There are two main 
types of commercial paper: unsecured and asset-backed. 
Unsecured commercial paper consists of promissory notes 
issued by financial or nonfinancial institutions with a fixed 
maturity of 1 to 270 days, unless the paper is issued with the 
option of an extendable maturity. Unsecured commercial 
paper is not backed by collateral, which makes the credit rating 
of the originating institution a key variable in determining 
the cost of issuance. 
Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) is collateralized 
by other financial assets and therefore is a secured form of 
borrowing. Historically, senior tranches of asset-backed 
securities (ABS) have served as collateral for ABCP. As such, 
ABCP is a financial instrument that has frequently provided 
maturity transformation: While the underlying loans or 
mortgages in the ABS are of long maturity (typically five to 
thirty years), ABCP maturities range between 1 and 270 days. 
Institutions that issue ABCP first sell their assets to a 
bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle (SPV).2 The SPV 
then issues the ABCP, which is backed by the assets in the 
2 An SPV is a legal entity created to serve a particular function—in this case, 
purchasing or financing specific assets. “Bankruptcy remoteness” refers to 
assets of an SPV being shielded from the bankruptcy of the sponsoring 
institution. 
vehicle and also by backup credit lines of the sponsoring 
institution. If the sponsoring institution enters bankruptcy, 
the assets of the SPV do not become part of the sponsor’s 
pool of assets. 
All commercial paper is traded in the over-the-counter 
market, where money market desks of securities broker-dealers 
and banks provide underwriting and market-making services. 
In the United States, commercial paper is cleared and settled 
by the Depository Trust Company (DTC).3
Commercial paper provides institutions with direct access 
to the money market. In traditional bank-intermediated 
financial systems, borrowing institutions obtain loans from 
commercial banks, which in turn are funded primarily by 
deposits. Since the early 1980s, however, the U.S. financial 
system has undergone a major transformation, as an ever-
increasing fraction of credit intermediation migrated from 
banks to financial markets. 
One way to gauge the degree to which this process of 
disintermediation affected the commercial paper market is to 
compare outstanding commercial paper with the money stock. 
Commercial paper represented only 30 percent of the money 
stock measure (M1) in 1980. It overtook M1 in mid-1998 and, 
at its peak, was 60 percent larger than M1 in August 2007 
(Chart 1).4 The sharp contractions of commercial paper in 
2007 and 2008 led the ratio of commercial paper to M1 to fall 
3 DTC is a subsidiary of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation. 
See http://www.dtcc.com/.
4 M1 consists of: 1) currency outside the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks, 
and the vaults of depository institutions; 2) travelers checks of nonbank issuers; 
3) demand deposits; and 4) other checkable deposits.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2011 27





















below 72 percent in the second half of 2009, a fraction not seen 
since the mid-1990s.
The mix of unsecured commercial paper and ABCP in the 
market has varied considerably over the last few years, as ABCP 
represented more than 45 percent of the market between 2001 
and 2007. The rise of ABCP is intertwined with the growth 
of securitization. Since 1998, financial intermediaries have 
increasingly relied on ABCP as a source of funding for assets 
warehoused for securitization.5 In the decade prior to the crisis, 
ABCP increased from $250 billion in 1997 to more than 
$1 trillion by 2007 (that is, from roughly 20 percent to as much 
as 50 percent of outstanding commercial paper), fueled by the 
considerable distribution of residential mortgage exposure 
through structured finance products. 
Outstanding commercial paper peaked at a total market 
value of $2.2 trillion in August 2007. At that time, ABCP 
accounted for more than 52 percent of the total market, 
while financial commercial paper accounted for an additional 
38 percent and nonfinancial commercial paper approximately 
10 percent. Between August 15, 2007, and September 15, 2008, 
the market experienced a notable decline associated with 
mounting credit problems of ABCP collateral. The initial 
decline of outstanding ABCP is often used to date the 
beginning of the first wave of the 2007-09 financial crisis.6 
As the deterioration of the U.S. housing market accelerated
in the summer of 2007, the riskiness of the ABS used as 
collateral in ABCP transactions increased. As a result, ABCP 
issuers struggled to issue commercial paper. 
Between September 2007 and January 2008, total assets of 
commercial banks grew unusually fast as many ABS that were 
previously funded in the ABCP market were moved from the 
balance sheets of ABCP issuers to those of commercial banks. 
As a result of a drying up of funding in the ABCP market, 
commercial banks started to fund the ABS in unsecured money 
markets, such as the Libor (London interbank offered rate), 
Eurodollar, and commercial paper markets, all of which would 
also become compromised at the peak of the crisis as credit risk 
reached extreme levels.
2.1 Major Commercial Paper Issuers 
The Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve provide an 
overview of issuers in the commercial paper market since the 
early 1980s (Chart 2). In the past decade, ABS issuers were the 
largest issuers of commercial paper, usually in the form of 
5 For an overview of asset-backed commercial paper, see Covitz, Liang, and 
Suarez (2009). Overviews of the securitization markets are provided by Adrian, 
Ashcraft, and Pozsar (2009) and Acharya and Schnabl (2010).
6 For a comprehensive timeline of the financial crisis, see http://
timeline.stlouisfed.org/. 
ABCP. Commercial paper funding of ABS stopped growing 
after Enron’s bankruptcy in 2001, as changes in accounting 
and regulatory practices concerning off-balance-sheet entities 
required that additional capital be held against the entities 
on the balance sheet.7 At the end of 2003, capital regulation 
regarding off-balance-sheet conduits changed, and the growth 
of ABS-issued commercial paper resumed. Indeed, the growth 
in ABS issuance goes hand in hand with the growth of 
outstanding ABCP. 
The second-largest issuers of commercial paper in recent 
years have been foreign issuers of U.S.-dollar-denominated 
paper, which include foreign banks and other financial 
institutions. Other issuers of commercial paper include finance 
companies, nonfinancial corporations, and commercial banks. 
For commercial banks, commercial paper issuance is relatively 
expensive; a combination of deposits—checking deposits, term 
deposits, or certificates of deposit—and borrowing in the 
federal funds market is usually a less expensive funding 
alternative than commercial paper (Chart 3), although a bank 
holding company might issue commercial paper more readily 
given the limited availability of deposits and financing that 
can be transferred from its commercial banks.8 However, 
commercial paper does provide a marginal source of funding 
to the commercial banking sector and, at times—and at least 
for certain issuers—commercial paper rates are actually lower 
than other money market rates, such as Eurodollar rates.
7 For an overview of recent accounting changes concerning off-balance-sheet 
vehicles, see http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=FASBContent
_C&pagename=FASB%2FFASBContent_C%2FNewsPage&cid=1176155633483.
8 The relationship between commercial banks and affiliated subsidiaries is 
constrained by section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act; see http://
www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section23a.htm.28 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Note: Libor is the London interbank offered rate.
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As credit conditions deteriorated in the second half of 2007, 
many commercial banks took back onto their balance sheets 
obligations that were formerly held in off-balance-sheet 
vehicles and funded in the ABCP market. As a result, funding 
for these loans, mortgages, and securities migrated from the 
ABCP market to the unsecured interbank market, leading to 
a widening of the spread between Libor and the federal 
funds rate. 
2.2 Lenders in the Commercial Paper Market
Commercial paper is held by many classes of investors (Chart 4). 
The largest share of ownership is by money market mutual funds, 
followed by the foreign sector, and then by mutual funds that are 
not money market mutual funds. Other financial institutions that 
hold commercial paper include nonfinancial corporations, 
commercial banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. 
The creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility is 
closely tied to the operation of money market mutual funds. 
Money market funds in the United States are regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Investment 
Company Act of 1940. Rule 2a-7 of the Act restricts 
investments by quality, maturity, and diversity. Under this 
rule, money market funds are limited to investing mainly in 
highly rated debt with maturities of less than thirteen months. 
A fund’s portfolio must maintain a weighted-average maturity 
of ninety days or less, and money market funds cannot invest 
more than 5 percent in any one issuer, except for government 
securities and repurchase agreements (repos). Eligible money 
market securities include commercial paper, repos, short-term 
bonds, and other money market funds.
Money market funds seek a stable $1 net asset value (NAV). 
If a fund’s NAV drops below $1, the fund is said to have 
“broken the buck.” Money market funds, to preserve a stable 
NAV, must have securities that are liquid and have low credit 
risk. Between 1971—when the first money market fund was 
created in the United States—and September 2008, only one 
2a-7 fund had broken the buck: the Community Bankers U.S. 
Government Money Market Fund of Denver, in 1994. In light 
of disruptions to the sector in 2008, the SEC is currently 
reevaluating 2a-7 guidelines and considering the mandating 
of floating NAVs and the shortening of weighted-average 
maturities.9
2.3 The Commercial Paper Crisis 
of September 2008
Considerable strains in the commercial paper market emerged 
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on 
September 15, 2008. Exposure to Lehman forced the Reserve 
Primary Fund to break the buck on September 16. As a result, 
money market investors reallocated their funds from prime 
money market funds to those that held only government 
securities (Chart 5). 
9 For more details on the money market mutual fund universe and the 
regulation of 2a-7 funds, see http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfmmkt.htm.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2011 29
Source: iMoney.
Note: The band denotes September 16-October 21.
 
Chart 5










2010 2009 2008 2007
This reallocation unleashed a tidal wave of redemption 
demands that overwhelmed the funds’ immediate liquid 
reserves. In the week following the Lehman bankruptcy, prime 
money market mutual funds received more than $117 billion 
in redemption requests from investors concerned about losses 
on presumably safe investments, possible contagion from 
Lehman’s bankruptcy, and financial institutions with large 
exposures to subprime assets. As a result, 2a-7 money market 
mutual funds were reluctant, and in some cases unable, to 
purchase commercial paper (or other money market assets 
with credit exposure). Any purchases made were concentrated 
in very short maturities; shortening the duration of their asset 
holdings made it easier for money market funds to manage 
uncertainty over further redemptions. 
As demand by money market funds shrank, commercial 
paper issuers were unable to issue term paper and instead 
issued overnight paper. Thus, with each passing maturity date 
of commercial paper outstanding, an issuer’s rollover risk 
increased sharply. Banks bore the increasing risk of having their 
credit lines drawn by issuers unable to place commercial paper 
in the market precisely when the banks themselves were having 
difficulty securing funding from the market and were 
attempting to reduce risk.10 
More broadly, the deepening dysfunction in the commercial 
paper market risked greater disruptions across the real 
economy. The sudden disruption in commercial paper 
issuance led to higher issuing costs, forced asset sales by entities 
10 Commercial banks provide a liquidity backstop for issuers of commercial 
paper. Rating agencies require that issuers have in place lines of credit in a 
stipulated percentage of the maximum dollar amount of commercial paper 
that may be outstanding under the program. See Bond Market Association 
and Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (2003). 
unable to raise cash, resulted in greater insolvency risk among 
issuers, and increased pressure on credit lines from commercial 
banks. Together, these factors resulted in reduced credit 
availability to individuals and businesses generally. 
The commercial paper market was vulnerable to the credit, 
rollover, and liquidity risks that, although small in a period 
of stable rates and high liquidity, emerged in the wake of 
the Lehman crisis. Investors averse to credit risk shunned 
commercial paper issuers that had previously been considered 
of high quality but were now thought to be candidates for 
default. Domestic financial paper issuance plummeted 24 per-
cent in late 2008. Likewise, rollover risk—the likelihood that 
investors will have to be compensated when the issuer rolls 
over the maturing paper—is magnified when issuers face lack 
of demand. A combination of liquidity risk and jump-to-
default risk was manifested through sharp increases in the rates 
on A2/P2-rated nonfinancial paper, whose spreads in excess 
of the overnight index swap (OIS) rate rose from 296 basis 
points on the Friday prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy to 504 basis 
points one week later. Over the period from September 15 to 
December 31, the spread averaged 539 basis points. These 
inherent risks in commercial paper were heightened as money 
market mutual funds, the principal investors in commercial 
paper, retreated from this market.
In the month following the Lehman bankruptcy, 
commercial paper outstanding shrank by $300 billion. About 
70 percent of this sharp decline was led by the financial 
commercial paper sector, while 20 percent was attributed to 
a shrinking of the ABCP market. Notably, the nonfinancial 
sector was responsible for only a 6 percent retrenchment in the 
size of total commercial paper outstanding. In the period 
between the Lehman bankruptcy and the start of the CPFF, 
total outstanding commercial paper fell sharply, to $1.5 trillion 
from $1.8 trillion. By the end of September 2008, more than 
75 percent of commercial paper financing was being rolled over 
each day, leaving the market unusually exposed to additional 
liquidity shocks. 
As rollover risk escalated, institutions relying on 
commercial paper were increasingly vulnerable to bankruptcy 
if money market fund investors pulled away from the 
commercial paper market. Concerned by this growing risk, 
the Federal Reserve considered ways to stabilize short-term 
funding markets by providing additional sources of funding to 
stave off liquidity-driven defaults and help reduce rollover risk. 
2.4 The Federal Reserve’s Response
The CPFF was part of a series of extraordinary policy 
interventions in late 2008 by the Federal Reserve and other U.S. 
government agencies. Other important interventions included:30 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
1. the expansion of eligible collateral for the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) on September 14; 
2. the expansion of foreign exchange swap lines with foreign 
central banks on September 18; 
3. the creation, on September 19, of the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF), which extended “nonrecourse loans” 
(secured loans on which lenders can seize pledged 
collateral to minimize loss upon default) at the primary 
credit rate to U.S. depository institutions and bank 
holding companies to finance their purchases of high-
quality ABCP from money market mutual funds; 
4. the announcement of a temporary guarantee program 
for money market mutual funds on September 19;  
5. the October 14 announcement by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) of the creation of the 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) to 
guarantee the senior debt of all FDIC-insured institutions 
and their holding companies as well as deposits in 
non-interest-bearing deposit transactions; 
6. the announcement of the Money Market Investor 
Funding Facility (MMIFF) on October 21;
7. the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF) on November 25, under which the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York was authorized to lend up 
to $200 billion on a nonrecourse basis to holders of 
AAA-rated ABS and recently originated consumer 
and small-business loans; and
8. the November 25 announcement by the Federal Reserve 
that it would purchase the direct obligations of housing-
related government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and 
mortgage-backed securities backed by the GSEs.11 
 3. CPFF Design and Operation
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility was designed to 
stabilize short-term financing markets by providing an 
additional source of funding to institutions to help them 
reduce reinvestment risk and stave off liquidity-driven 
defaults. To accomplish this, a special-purpose vehicle—the 
CPFF LLC—was created to purchase ninety-day commercial 
11 See Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews (2009) for more on the PDCF; Fleming, 
Hrung, and Keane (2009) for details on the TSLF; Davis, McAndrews, and 
Franklin (2009) for a review of the MMIFF; Ashcraft, Malz, and Pozsar (2010) 
for more on the TALF; and Adrian and Shin (2010) for an overview of the 
liquidity facilities in a broader context. The impact of the CPFF and other 
credit and liquidity programs on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and its 
income statement is described at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/bst_fedfinancials.htm.
paper from highly rated U.S. issuers and effectively pledge it to 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in exchange for cash. 
In the twenty days between the announcement of the CPFF 
and its first purchases from registered users, Federal Reserve 
staff fine-tuned the facility’s terms and conditions and its 
operational design, which included building a new legal, 
trading, investment, custodial, and administrative 
infrastructure as well as establishing essential financial and 
operational risk controls. For the CPFF to be effective as a 
liquidity backstop, it had to be simple to use, compliant with 
existing market conventions, open to a large cross section of the 
commercial paper market while minimizing credit risk to the 
Reserve Bank, priced to relieve funding market pressures, and 
implemented quickly to forestall another liquidity event. The 
facility’s terms and conditions ultimately addressed these 
objectives.12 
3.1 Operational Design 
A market backstop required accessibility by any issuer in the 
market. However, purchases of commercial paper could not be 
open to any firm needing access to short-term funding, as this 
would have deviated from the intent of offering a backstop to 
issuers whose short-term funding was disrupted by liquidity 
events rather than the firm’s own credit event. To minimize 
credit risk, the Federal Reserve limited purchases to top-tier 
paper, rated A1/P1/F1 or higher, consistent with 2a-7 fund 
conventions in place at the time.13 In late 2008, top-tier 
commercial paper accounted for nearly 90 percent of the 
market, indicating that the criterion would allow the facility to 
backstop the vast majority of the market while also shielding 
the Federal Reserve from lower quality credits in the market. 
To effectively reduce rollover risk, the CPFF had to offer 
term financing beyond what the Federal Reserve had extended 
up to that point.14 Since term commercial paper is most liquid 
at one- and three-month tenors and funding concerns for the 
year-end were mounting, three-month commercial paper 
became the logical tenor to offer issuers. Furthermore, the 
facility gave assurance that the purchases of commercial paper 
would be held to maturity rather than liquidated shortly 
thereafter.
12 For a comprehensive overview of terms and conditions, frequently asked 
questions, announcements, and operational details relating to the CPFF, 
see http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/cpff.html.
13 A split rating was acceptable if two ratings were top-tier.
14 The Fed had already started the twenty-eight-day Term Auction Facility 
(TAF) in December 2007. On July 30, 2008, an extension to an eighty-four-day 
maturity was announced, with an effective date of August 11, 2008. For an 












































Note: Solid lines represent steps in the transaction; dashed lines represent some of the controls.
 
In establishing the CPFF, the Federal Reserve faced the 
added complication of engaging in transactions that fell 
outside of the central bank’s traditional operating framework. 
Prior to the creation of the CPFF, temporary emergency 
lending facilities created under section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act were forms of secured borrowing with traditional 
counterparties—that is, depository institutions or primary 
dealers. To address the risks that had emerged in the 
commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve had to expand 
its lending to include U.S. corporations as well as financial 
institutions that would usually not have direct access to its 
market operations (finance companies, for example). 
The Federal Reserve’s financial transactions were limited 
to open market operations with primary dealers and loans 
to depository institutions through the discount window.15 
The CPFF operation married aspects of both types of Fed 
operations with the market conventions of the commercial 
paper market. To execute CPFF transactions, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York used its primary dealers as agents 
to the transactions between the Fed and commercial paper 
issuers. Primary dealers actively underwrite, place, and make 
markets in the commercial paper market, and they had the 
ability to funnel CPFF issuance from their clientele to the 
facility each day. 
By designating primary dealers as agents to the CPFF 
transactions, the facility effectively expanded its reach to 
hundreds of firms looking for backstop financing. Trade 
execution was conducted electronically, with controls and 
accuracy checks, and processed “straight through” with limited 
15 These included loans of cash and securities as well as purchases and sales 
of U.S. Treasury and government agency debt.
manual intervention, allowing multitudes of trades to be 
executed quickly and accurately and settled on the same day. 
The same-day settlement feature assured firms that the CPFF 
could meet an unexpected liquidity need. 
Building the facility’s infrastructure in a compressed 
timeframe proved a substantial challenge, so the Federal 
Reserve enlisted the services of experienced market 
participants, including Pacific Investment Management 
Company (PIMCO) and State Street Bank and Trust 
Company. The SPV created by the Federal Reserve—
CPFF LLC—was held in custody at State Street, a depository 
institution. Creating the SPV facilitated discount window 
lending to the commercial paper market. Each day, CPFF 
purchases were matched by a loan from the New York Fed’s 
discount window to the custodian bank, which then 
transferred the loan amount to the SVP to fund the purchases. 
At maturity, the transaction unwound this way: The issuer 
paid the CPFF LLC the loan principal plus interest, which was 
determined by the interest rate set on the date of issuance, and 
the SPV paid the Federal Reserve Bank of New York the 
principal and interest on its loan, set at the federal funds target 
on the original loan date.16 Because the custodian bank, the 
issuing and paying agent (hired by the issuer to administer the 
issuance of and payments on the commercial paper), and all 
primary dealers cleared commercial paper through the 
Depository Trust Company, the CPFF had in place a 
mechanism that allowed it to purchase commercial paper 
efficiently through the market’s standard clearing institution 
(see exhibit).
16 If the target federal funds rate was a range, then the loan was set at the 
maximum rate within that range.32 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
To sell commercial paper to the CPFF LLC, an issuer was 
required to register in advance of the initial issuance.17 The 
registration process allowed the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to verify eligibility criteria (including the 
maximum amount the issuer could sell to the facility), review 
the issuer’s credit quality, and, among other logistics, process 
the registration fee. While the vast majority of registrants 
issued to the CPFF shortly after registering, some registered 
to retain the option of future issuance should the need arise. 
The CPFF’s registration period began on October 20, 2008, 
one week prior to the first purchase date, to allow time for 
processing the large number of issuers that wanted the option 
of issuing to the facility at its inception. 
3.2 The CPFF as Liquidity Backstop
Eligibility requirements associated with tenor, credit quality, 
pricing, and maximum issuance were structured to help limit 
the use of the facility to backstop financing.18 Of all these 
requirements, the facility’s pricing structure was the most 
influential. It was absolutely essential that the rates on CPFF 
issuance were precisely calibrated to ease financial market 
stress by offering financing at a rate below the market’s extreme 
levels. At the same time, the Federal Reserve had to ensure that 
the rates were not too attractive; otherwise, issuers would rely 
heavily on the CPFF, potentially impairing long-run liquidity 
and market functioning in the commercial paper market. On 
October 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve released the pricing 
structure for the facility (see table).
17 An “issuer” is the legal entity that issues the commercial paper. If a parent 
company and a subsidiary issued commercial paper separately, they were 
considered separate issuers for the purposes of the CPFF. Only U.S. issuers of 
commercial paper, including U.S. issuers with a foreign parent, were eligible to 
sell commercial paper to the SPV. 
18 The SPV was allowed to purchase only three-month, U.S.-dollar-
denominated unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper (rated at least 
A1/P1/F1) from U.S. issuers or U.S.-based issuers of a foreign parent company. 
Although split ratings (such that one rating is Tier 2) were accepted, A2/P2 
paper—which represents about 5 percent of issuance in the commercial paper 
market—was ineligible.
The facility controlled for changes in short-term interest 
rates by setting the price of commercial paper issuance to the 
CPFF at a fixed spread above the daily three-month OIS rate. 
As is common practice in the market, commercial paper issued 
to the CPFF was sold at a discount from face value, as 
determined by the lending rate, using the standard interest 
calculations and the actual over-360-day-count convention. 
The all-in costs of the OIS plus 200 and 300 basis points per 
year on unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper, 
respectively, were determined after performing historical 
analysis of several factors, including investment-grade 
financing rates in recent interest rate cycles, average spreads 
between unsecured and asset-backed paper, and estimation of 
potential losses on a diversified portfolio of commercial paper. 
The higher funding costs for ABCP in the market (and in the 
CPFF pricing structure), relative to unsecured issuance backed 
by the full faith and credit of the issuing entity, were an 
indicator of the riskiness and illiquidity of the underlying 
collateral in ABCP conduits. In addition to conducting 
empirical analysis, Federal Reserve staff surveyed a large 
number of market participants to distinguish between the 
credit and liquidity components of commercial paper rates 
at the height of the crisis. 
Purchases of commercial paper had to be secured to the 
satisfaction of the Federal Reserve. Because financial and 
nonfinancial commercial paper is unsecured, the Fed needed to 
find alternative means to secure the loans. Although financial 
institutions could pledge financial assets as collateral against a 
loan (similar to a discount window transaction), nonfinancial 
commercial paper issuers would not necessarily have the same 
privilege. Assessing the value of nonfinancial assets would 
further complicate lending. 
Lenders are generally compensated for taking risk by 
charging higher interest rates or, in the case of a line of credit, 
assessing fees on usage. An assessment of a credit surcharge 
more closely approximated market practice and thus became 
the default practice for securing a loan. Participation in 
the FDIC’s TLGP qualified as a satisfactory guarantee for 
unsecured commercial paper, as the U.S. government ensured 
repayment on the commercial paper at maturity, thus 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility Pricing Structure
Rates and Fees Unsecured Commercial Paper Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Lending rate  Three-month OIS + 100 basis points Three-month OIS + 300 basis points 
Credit surcharge 100 basis points None
    All-in cost Three-month OIS + 200 basis points Three-month OIS + 300 basis points
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Note: OIS is the overnight index swap rate.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2011 33
removing credit risk.19 TLGP issuers were not required to pay 
the unsecured credit surcharge. As the TLGP was not fully 
operational on the CPFF’s inception date, TLGP issuers were 
initially charged an unsecured credit surcharge for paper 
sold to the facility; however, these fees were subsequently 
reimbursed once it was established that the entity was covered 
by the TLGP.
The registration fee for the CPFF was an additional feature 
that further underlined the nature of the facility as a liquidity 
backstop. The pricing of the registration fee was not dissimilar 
to a commitment fee that a bank would charge a borrower for 
an available line of credit. This fee effectively served as an 
insurance premium, whereby the issuer bought the option of 
issuing to the facility at any time over the life of the program. 
The 10 basis point fee was charged on the maximum amount 
an issuer could sell to the CPFF, or the greatest amount of 
U.S.-dollar-denominated commercial paper the issuer had 
outstanding on any day between January 1 and August 31, 
2008. The maximum amount of issuance to the CPFF was 
reduced by any commercial paper outstanding with investors 
at the time of issuance, including paper issued to the CPFF. 
 These criteria supported the backstop nature of the facility 
by limiting issuance to the amount of paper that the institution 
maintained prior to the market disruptions in September 2008, 
rather than providing additional funding to grow or leverage 
issuers’ balance sheets. These terms also disqualified firms that 
were not previously active participants in the commercial 
paper market from accessing funding through the CPFF.20 
The CPFF’s pricing structure and other program 
requirements helped ensure that the facility played a 
constructive role in restoring stability to the market. At the 
same time, they also served to: 1) prevent artificial inflation of 
issuance beyond what may be absorbed by investor demand 
under normal conditions, 2) ensure that the facility was used as 
a backstop in times of stress while also providing a disincentive 
to issue to the facility under more liquid market conditions, 
and 3) mitigate the credit risk associated with adverse selection 
to minimize the Federal Reserve’s exposure to loss relative to 
its accumulated capital from program fees.
19 For each unsecured commercial paper transaction to the CPFF, the issuer 
was charged 100 basis points per year, calculated from the face value of the 
commercial paper at the time of settlement. When distributing the proceeds 
of the new commercial paper issuance, the SPV reduced the funds due the 
issuer by an amount equal to the unsecured credit surcharge. 
20 An ABCP issuer was also deemed inactive if it did not issue ABCP to 
institutions other than the sponsoring institution for any consecutive period of 
three months or longer between January 1 and August 31, 2008. A few months 
after the facility’s inception, the Federal Reserve clarified these terms for ABCP 
issuers, announcing that the CPFF would not purchase ABCP from issuers that 
were inactive prior to the creation of the facility.
3.3 The Fed’s Counterparty Credit 
Risk Management
From the Federal Reserve’s perspective, CPFF lending rates 
were analogous to setting haircuts on a nonrecourse loan. In 
setting penalty rates for eligible commercial paper, the Federal 
Reserve faced a trade-off: Higher penalty rates protect the 
central bank from credit risk; however, they limit the amount 
of liquidity available to the financial system. 
For a given CPFF interest rate, a rate lower than those 
available in the market could provide market participants with 
arbitrage opportunities. In essence, the Federal Reserve lent 
against specific collateral types—in this case, highly rated 
commercial paper—at a penalty rate and held a margin of 
excess collateral, including cash collateral that should protect 
it against any loss under normal market conditions. 
The anticipated credit risk of the facility’s aggregate 
exposure was an important factor guiding the selection of 
registration and credit enhancement fees as well as rates for 
unsecured and asset-backed paper. An initial analysis of the 
facility’s credit risk was conducted to determine ranges of 
expected and unexpected losses under normal and stressed 
market conditions. Hypothetical stress losses of 1.03 percent to 
1.38 percent were found to reflect historical loss probabilities 
based on downgrade probabilities of short- and long-term 
ratings. Any estimated potential credit losses by the CPFF SPV 
were offset by the facility’s invested income from fees and 
interest received on maturing paper.
 In this regard, the cumulative invested income represented 
the capital available to absorb potential credit losses. The large 
flow of interest income from the first wave of maturities 
increased the facility’s total capital to more than $2 billion, 
yielding a leverage ratio of nearly 3.4 percent (the leverage ratio 
is the book value of equity—accumulated through the fee 
income—divided by the book value of total commercial paper 
held in the facility). This capital cushion provided a sufficient 
buffer to absorb the portfolio’s stress losses at a 99 percent 
confidence level, as calculated by a team of New York Fed 
economists and PIMCO credit analysts. Nevertheless, the 
facility’s credit exposures were more concentrated than a 
highly granular loan portfolio at a commercial bank, so its 
ex post loss results could vary significantly from historical loss 
trends. On February 1, 2010, the date the CPFF expired, the 
facility had accumulated income in excess of the commercial 
paper held in the SPV; as a result, no losses were incurred.34 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
3.4 Moral Hazard
The mere existence of a liquidity backstop raises concerns 
about moral hazard. In the case of the CPFF, expectations that 
the Fed would act as a lender of last resort and purchase 
commercial paper could have led issuers to engage in riskier 
behavior than they otherwise would have. Through its 
eligibility restrictions, the CPFF was structured to address 
this possibility of moral hazard. 
For example, several months into the program, the 
eligibility rules were altered to deter the unintended 
consequence of reviving ABCP conduits that had exited the 
market. On January 23, 2009, the Federal Reserve announced 
that the CPFF would not purchase ABCP from issuers that 
were inactive prior to the facility’s creation. In this way, 
policymakers sought to limit moral hazard through issuance 
that no longer had a natural investor base. In addition, the 
CPFF accepted only paper rated A1/P1. Presumably, issuers 
that engaged in riskier behavior would risk their top-tier credit 
rating and, consequently, jeopardize their eligibility for the 
facility. 
Despite these eligibility restrictions, as long as a liquidity 
backstop exists for an asset market, there will always be some 
risk that issuers expect liquidity gaps to be filled for higher 
rated financial and asset-backed commercial paper. One way 
around this implicit moral hazard would be to publish 
information on participation with a lag. The attendant cost 
of such publication, however, is the associated stigma. This 
creates a risk that the facility will not be used when it is needed 
most, even in cases where the liquidity risk is broad-based 
rather than firm-specific. 
3.5 The CPFF’s Relation to Other 
Federal Reserve Liquidity Facilities
To address the strains in dollar funding markets that emerged 
immediately after the Primary Reserve Fund “broke the buck,” 
the Federal Reserve introduced, in addition to the CPFF, 
two other facilities under section 13(3): the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility. All 
three facilities supported short-term funding markets and 
thereby increased the availability of credit through various 
mechanisms, although the CPFF was used more heavily than 
the other facilities. 
Two factors help explain the CPFF’s considerable use. First, 
the CPFF addressed problems in short-term debt markets at 
their root—through direct lending to issuers—at a time when 
issuers faced potential liquidity shortfalls as a result of market 
dislocations. Indeed, the main factor distinguishing the CPFF 
from the other two facilities is the CPFF’s role as a backstop to 
issuers, whereas the other facilities provide emergency lending 
to institutional money market investors. Second, the CPFF 
backstopped issuance of both unsecured and secured 
commercial paper, while the AMLF funded only ABCP and the 
MMIFF special-purpose vehicles purchased only certificates of 
deposit, bank notes, and commercial paper from specific 
financial institutions.21 
While the MMIFF was a liquidity facility for money market 
mutual funds in the case of abrupt withdrawals by investors, 
the CPFF effectively bypassed the money market universe by 
allowing issuers to issue directly into it. Thus, the two facilities 
addressed slightly different needs.
The AMLF was launched by the Federal Reserve on 
September 19, 2008. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston was 
authorized to make loans to U.S. depository institutions and 
bank holding companies for the purpose of financing 
purchases of ABCP from money market mutual funds. The 
program specifically sought to help the money market mutual 
funds facing elevated redemption requests to meet their 
funding needs. The AMLF operated via a custodian bank, 
and lending occurred directly through the discount window. 
Money market mutual funds sold ABCP to their custodian 
bank, which would subsequently pledge the ABCP to the 
discount window against a cash loan. The AMLF was made 
operational in a very short timeframe, because it was much less 
complex than the CPFF. However, the AMLF accepted only 
highly rated ABCP, not unsecured commercial paper. AMLF 
usage peaked on October 8, 2008. 
The CPFF, PDCF, TSLF, TALF, and AMLF shared the 
common features of being liquidity facilities aimed at 
stabilizing funding in the money markets and being created to 
counteract the financial market turbulence that threatened the 
stability of the system as a whole. 22 Effectively, these facilities 
extended the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort role to 
include nondepository institutions (the PDCF, TSLF, and 
AMLF) and specific securities markets (the CPFF and TALF). 
The facilities were based on the Federal Reserve’s ability to 
extend credit to “any individual, partnership, or corporation” 
under “unusual and exigent circumstances,” as per section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.23
21 The economic rationale for the MMIFF is described in detail by Davis, 
McAndrews, and Franklin (2009).
22 See also the November 18, 2008, testimony of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben 
Bernanke before the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Financial 
Services on the subject of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and the Federal 
Reserve’s liquidity facilities: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/bernanke20081118a.htm.
23 For details on the powers of Federal Reserve Banks, see http://
www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section13.htm.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2011 35
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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4. CPFF Usage and Its Impact on 
the Commercial Paper Market
An issuer’s decision to use the CPFF was predicated in part on 
the cost of issuance to the facility relative to the cost of issuance 
in the market or other alternative funding sources. As we 
discussed, the facility’s pricing was designed to be cost-effective 
during times of market stress, but prohibitively expensive 
during times of normal market function. Accordingly, as 
conditions in financing markets normalized in 2009, CPFF 
usage progressively declined.
4.1 Usage and Market Impact
The facility’s assets grew rapidly at inception, reaching 
$144 billion in the first week of operation. Assets more 
than doubled, to $293 billion, after one month and totaled 
$333 billion by the end of December 2008 (Chart 6). CPFF peak 
usage occurred in the third week of January 2009, exactly 
three months after the first issuance date, with approximately 
$350 billion in commercial paper held in the SPV. Throughout 
2009, CPFF use steadily declined, reaching a level of around 
$10 billion in December. 
At its peak level, the portfolio was primarily composed of 
financial commercial paper. The portfolio became more and 
more tilted toward ABCP after the first vintage of the CPFF 
matured at the end of January 2009. The large share of ABCP 
in the facility, which continued to increase during 2009, 
illustrated the continuing difficulties obtaining funding in 
collateralized money markets. 
Issuers to the CPFF included a variety of ABCP conduits—
single-seller, hybrid, multi-seller, and securities arbitrage 
conduits—and other financial institutions that conducted 
banking, insurance, and credit finance in the United States. 
Issuance trends varied widely across registrants, reflecting 
the ability of issuers to finance in the market, reduced leverage 
in the financial system, a consolidation of issuers in the 
marketplace, and access to other government programs, 
among other factors.24
24 Single-seller conduits are established to fund the assets originated by one 
seller, or one seller and its subsidiaries and related entities, while multi-seller 
conduits are structured to fund assets originated by a variety of sellers, typically 
all clients of the sponsoring commercial bank. Securities arbitrage issuers 
primarily fund highly rated securities, and investors in the conduits are 
exposed to the risk of default, or credit risk, of those securities. Hybrid conduits 
incorporate the structural features of two or more conduit types. Most hybrid 
conduits have multi-seller and securities arbitrage characteristics. Bate, 
Bushweller, and Rutan (2003) explain conduits in more detail.
As of December 31, 2009, two-thirds of CPFF holdings were 
unsecured and the remaining third constituted ABCP. The 
unsecured paper was issued predominantly by banks and 
nonbank financials (diversified financials), some of which 
included TLGP-guaranteed paper. Insurance companies also 
issued unsecured paper, although to a lesser degree. By the end 
of 2009, many insurance companies faced losses in light of their 
exposure to mortgage financing; insurance represented just 
one of many sectors adversely affected by the financial crisis 
and economic downturn. Rating agencies subsequently 
downgraded the commercial paper of several insurance 
companies, effectively compromising their eligibility for 
the CPFF. 
ABCP issuance accounted for a growing proportion of assets 
in the CPFF, suggesting that conduits were having greater 
difficulty reentering the market and posing some risk of 
adverse selection in the facility. ABCP conduits were widely 
used as a means to fund “hard-to-finance” assets. Consequently, 
it was not surprising to observe a more gradual retrenchment 
from the facility by this sector. However, ABCP issuance in 
the market and in the CPFF declined naturally as assets 
amortized, securitization slowed, and assets were consolidated 
to parents’ balance sheets. In addition, ABCP programs shrank 
with changes to regulatory capital requirements and 
accounting rules. 
The CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial 
paper market, as shown in Chart 7. At its peak in January 2009, 
the CPFF held more than 20 percent of all outstanding 
commercial paper. By the time it expired on February 1, 2010, 36 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Note: CPFF is the Commercial Paper Funding Facility.
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the facility represented only 1 percent of market issuance. The 
self-liquidating feature of the CPFF is illustrated by the steady 
decline in the amount of outstanding commercial paper 
throughout 2009.
During the crisis period after Lehman’s bankruptcy and 
prior to the CPFF’s start-up, the fraction of term commercial 
paper issuance collapsed as money market funds shortened the 
duration of their assets to ensure against further redemption 
pressures (see Chart 8). In fact, more than 75 percent of 
commercial paper issued in the second half of September and 
in early October consisted of maturities of only one to four 
days. As a result of the shortened maturities, total weekly 
commercial paper issuance rose rapidly during the crisis. Once 
the CPFF started operation on October 27, term commercial 
paper issuance began rising and quickly reverted to a tight 
range of between 30 and 40 percent of total commercial paper. 
The expansion of the CPFF was accompanied by a 
narrowing of the spread between commercial paper rates 
and comparable OIS rates (Chart 9). The degree to which the 
narrower spread was attributable to the CPFF’s expansion 
requires further research, but the coincidence suggests that 
the program had a meaningful effect. 
The one-month AA-rated financials spread declined from 
188 basis points in October 2008 to 38 basis points in 
December 2009 (the latter being the average of daily business 
day rates during December). Over the same period, the ABCP 
spread declined from 256 basis points to 86 basis points.25 
25 The decline in the less liquid market of three-month commercial paper rates 
was also substantial. We report the one-month rates because of greater data 
availability. 
Meanwhile, the spread for A2/P2 commercial paper—which 
was not eligible for the CPFF—rose from 483 basis points to a 
December average of 503 basis points. The one-month A2/P2 
spreads to OIS continued to rise through the end of 2008, as 
creditors demanded increasing compensation from lower rated 
issuers for use of their balance sheets over year-end, a period 
when firms typically reduce leverage for the purpose of 
financial reporting and minimize risk amid a period of reduced 
market liquidity. Only after the passage of year-end did the 
spread between eligible A1/P1 and ineligible A2/P2 paper 
narrow.
The CPFF’s holdings rose rapidly in the first three months 
following the facility’s creation, likely because the rates it 
charged were considerably below the average market rates. As 
average commercial paper rates began to decline throughout 
2009, CPFF usage declined as well. 
Average spreads on commercial paper issued in the market 
(Chart 9) mask the actual cross-sectional dispersion of rates 
across issuers within each credit rating bucket. The underlying 
dispersion in rates owes partly to the fact that investors, 
particularly money market funds, have policies that limit their 
concentrations to counterparties in order to manage their credit 
exposure and maintain diversification. As money market funds 
effectively became more risk averse and attuned to credit 
differentiation, some funds responded to the financial crisis by 
either charging higher rates to issuers perceived as potentially 
more risky or barring certain names altogether from their 
portfolios. 
Continued issuance to the CPFF amid declining commercial 
paper rates highlighted the wide range of rates transacted in the FRBNY Economic Policy Review / May 2011 37
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Bloomberg.
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market. Although the one-month commercial paper interest 
rate charged for AA-rated ABCP averaged 32 basis points in the 
second half of 2009 and never exceeded 62 basis points, ABCP 
issuance into the CPFF at the penalty rate of 300 basis points 
(for the three-month maturity) occurred throughout the year, 
suggesting that some issuers continued to find CPFF rates 
attractive relative to market rates. 
Another possible explanation is that demand for issuance 
fell short of some issuers’ required funding needs. At the onset 
of the crisis, investors were less willing to hold large positions 
in commercial paper; thus, issuers may have been left with no 
option other than to satisfy remaining liquidity needs by 
issuing to the CPFF. 
4.2.“Roll”
“Roll” refers to times when issuers retire existing commercial 
paper at its maturity, but still require funding and therefore 
issue new paper. In other words, it represents the number of 
times when commercial paper is reissued, or “rolled over.” 
Because the maturity of CPFF commercial paper was ninety 
days, rolls occurred once a quarter. 
From the beginning of the CPFF to its end, there were 
five rolls of ninety-day commercial paper. The first roll was 
the most significant, given that CPFF holdings represented 
20 percent of the total commercial paper market. Market 
analysts had speculated that the still-fragile commercial paper 
market might come under additional strain if the maturing 
paper were reissued over a highly concentrated period into 
the private market. However, the first roll went smoothly, as 
issuance into the private market remained small and whatever 
financing returned to the commercial paper or other private 
markets was relatively dispersed (some issuers prefunded 
their CPFF maturities and used the proceeds to pay the 
maturing issuance in the CPFF). 
Throughout the second and third rolls, an increasing 
percentage of smaller dollar amounts came due and was paid 
down. By the fourth roll, in October 2009, approximately 
80 percent ($28 billion) of the commercial paper in the CPFF 
matured, of which roughly $20 billion was paid down. As a 
result, commercial paper holdings in the CPFF amounted to 
just 1 percent of the total commercial paper market following 
the penultimate roll.
The most dramatic effect of the rolls was seen in the 
composition of CPFF holdings. With each roll, ABCP became 
an even greater share of CPFF holdings as money funds 
continued to shun secured paper, particularly if it was 
perceived to be of poor credit quality. Most of the remaining 
ABCP may have been of lower credit quality and had no natural 
buyer. This transformation in CPFF holdings raised 
policymakers’ concerns about adverse selection into the 
program and about complications that would arise if certain 
issuers could not have repaid upon the program’s conclusion. 
4.3.Impact on the Federal Reserve’s 
Balance Sheet
Compared with the other new liquidity facilities or with 
outright purchases, the CPFF had a large effect on the Fed’s 
balance-sheet growth. Only foreign exchange swaps and the 
TAF made larger contributions. During this period of relatively 
rapid expansion in assets, the Fed’s liabilities expanded 
primarily through excess reserve balances, although some 
of the balance-sheet expansion was sterilized by increased 
issuance of Treasury SFP bills.26 While the CPFF contributed 
to growth in reserves, the contraction in the facility’s holdings 
also outpaced that of other Federal Reserve programs, given its 
punitive rate structure. This contraction significantly offset the 
reserves creation of later programs, such as the Large-Scale 
Asset Purchase Program.27
26 On September 17, 2008, the U.S. Treasury announced the Supplementary 
Financing Program (SFP), through which the Treasury issues a series of 
Treasury bills, separate from its current borrowing program, and deposits the 
proceeds from these issuances into an account at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. Funds in this account drain reserves from the banking system and 
therefore offset the reserve impact of Federal Reserve lending and liquidity 
initiatives. Interest on reserves is discussed in Keister and McAndrews (2009). 
27 The impact of the CPFF and other credit and liquidity programs on the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and income statement can be found at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_fedfinancials.htm.38 The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility
The CPFF’s penalty fee represented income for the Federal 
Reserve. The facility generated roughly $5 billion in net income 
from its inception to its close in April 2010. This amount 
represented a relatively large share of total profits from the 
liquidity facilities, estimated to be $12.9 billion as of December 
2009 (Fleming and Klagge 2009). These profits, which were 
transferred by the Federal Reserve to the Treasury, ultimately 
helped reduce the financial burden on taxpayers. 
The economic interpretation for the income generated 
by the CPFF is as follows. During fall 2008, the private 
market for commercial paper was severely disrupted by the 
reallocation of short-term savings from prime money market 
funds to Treasury-only funds. As a result, the Federal Reserve 
established the CPFF as a lender-of-last-resort facility to 
address the temporary liquidity distortions created by the 
money market reallocations. However, by law, the Federal 
Reserve had to protect itself against potential credit losses. 
It therefore loaned to commercial paper issuers at a penalty 
rate, which in turn generated income from the facility. 
While market rates for commercial paper were unusually 
high, commercial paper issuers were willing to pay the penalty 
rate, thereby transferring money to the taxpayer. As such, U.S. 
households gained in the aggregate. In addition to the fee 
income generated by the CPFF, taxpayers also benefited from 
the facility’s role in potentially preventing commercial paper 
issuers from being forced into bankruptcy, an event that could 
have distorted real investment decisions.
5.C o n c l u s i o n
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility serves as a noteworthy 
model for the Federal Reserve’s role as lender of last resort—a 
role that, in this case, reached beyond depository institutions. 
In contrast to traditional discount window lending, the CPFF 
supported liquidity in a particular market as opposed to 
supporting the liquidity of a particular set of institutions. Like 
the discount window, the CPFF was constructed as a backstop, 
not as a permanent source of funding. While the discount 
window accepts a very broad range of collateral—including 
loans, mortgages, and securities—the CPFF focused on a 
particular asset class, but had less stringent requirements for 
the types of institutions that can borrow. The CPFF can be 
considered a model of liquidity provision in a market-based 
financial system, where maturity transformation occurs 
outside of the commercial banking sector in a quantitatively 
and economically important magnitude.
The legal basis for the CPFF stemmed from section 13(3) 
of the Federal Reserve Act, requiring the use of such a facility 
in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” As such, the Federal 
Reserve does not have the authority to make the CPFF a 
permanent liquidity backstop. This in turn has implications 
for the ongoing debate on regulatory reform. The financial 
market crisis of 2007-09 demonstrated the current financial 
architecture’s vulnerabilities to liquidity crises emanating from 
nondepository institutions. As such, an important component 
of regulatory reform focuses on improving the resiliency of 
money markets to financial and economic shocks. Many 
ongoing reform efforts aim to reduce the vulnerability of 
money markets to liquidity crises. These efforts focus 
particularly on reforming money market funds, the 
commercial paper market, and the repo markets. 
It has long been understood that the public sector plays a 
crucial role in the provision of liquidity. In times of aggregate 
liquidity shortages, only the monetary authority can act as 
lender of last resort, owing to its ability to create money.28 
Traditionally, the lender of last resort has been available only to 
depository institutions because the vast majority of maturity 
and liquidity transformation took place in those institutions. 
Since the mid-1980s, however, the rapid growth of a market-
based system of credit formation has allowed for maturity 
transformation by a wide range of institutions, including 
money market funds, finance companies, and securities 
broker-dealers, and through a range of market instruments, 
such as asset-backed commercial paper and tri-party repo. 
 Despite the recent crisis, it seems likely that large amounts 
of maturity and liquidity transformation will continue to be 
conducted outside of depository institutions—and therefore 
without access to the traditional lender of last resort—in what 
is known as “the shadow banking system.”29 The public 
sector’s role in providing backstop liquidity to the shadow 
banking system will continue to be debated. Although the 
duration of the CPFF was necessarily limited, the facility 
provides a model for a market-based lender-of-last-resort 
liquidity backstop, which could serve as a guide for future 
policy discussion.
28 See Holmström and Tirole (1998) for a theory of public liquidity provision, 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for a classic justification of discount window 
lending, and Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2008) for a setting with 
rollover risk.
29 Adrian, Ashcraft, and Pozsar (2009) provide a detailed overview of the 
shadow banking system.References
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